

HISTORY OF MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

UNIT I

Descartes : Method, Ideas, Substance

1) René Descartes is rightly labelled as the ‘father of modern philosophy’. Why?

Ans: René Descartes is commonly considered to be the ‘father of modern philosophy’. Because the fundamental aim of Descartes was to attain philosophical truth by reason. Philosophy must rest on pure reason and not on tradition. He wanted to develop a whole system of philosophy based on true propositions which were part of an organic whole, so that nothing was presupposed but each would be self-evident and certain. For Descartes knowledge begins with some self-evident innate ideas or principles and deduces other truth from them. Hence, he wanted to give philosophy a new start, desiring to reject any authority.

2) Explain Descartes’ methodic doubt.

Ans: According to Descartes, the chief secret of method is to arrange all facts into a deductive, logical system. Descartes' goal is to build a system of philosophy based upon intuition and deduction which will remain as certain and as imperishable as geometry. What he is determined to find is a self-evident principle which will serve as the axiom or first principle for his mathematical philosophy, and which will serve as the foundation from which absolutely certain philosophy can be deduced.

In order to obtain mathematical certainty in philosophy he introduces his famous methodic doubt. He says that it is necessary to doubt everything and to regard as provisionally false anything of which there can be the slightest doubt. In this sense, it is universal doubt. It is called methodic doubt, and not the doubt of the Sceptics, because he uses this doubt only as a method, to attain certain knowledge. Sceptics doubted because they said it is impossible to attain certainty.

He doubted the testimony of the senses because the senses make mistakes. However, while carrying out his assigned task of subjecting all our knowledge methodically to doubt, Descartes was struck by one truth of which there could be no doubt whatever. From the fact that a person is thinking (even doubting), he knows at least that he exists, because he is carrying out these activities. This is the fundamental truth of the whole of Descartes’ Philosophy. “I think, therefore, I am”, “Cogito, ergo sum” (In Latin language). By intuition he knows that he could not think if he did not exist. Descartes, however, still doubts the existence of his body. Hence, the self he arrives at is only an immaterial thinking self, thinking substance (In Latin; *res cogitans*).

It is certain that I doubt or think. Doubt implies a doubter; thinking implies a thinker, a thinking thing (*res cogitans*) or spiritual substance; thus he reaches what seems to him a rational, self-evident

proposition. To doubt means to think, to think means to be; 'Cogito ergo sum'. "I think, therefore I am." It is the first and most certain knowledge that occurs to one who philosophizes in an orderly manner. Here is the principle we have been seeking- a certain, self- evident starting point.

In this process of doubting, we finally reach a solid foundation, for while we are doubting we are using the thinking process. In fact, our doubts imply the reality of our thoughts. Descartes' Cogito ergo sum was regarded by him as a primary truth of all human reason. Descartes' first axiom has significant implications. "I think, therefore I am" means that the existence of reason is more important than anything else; man's reality lies in his thinking process.

Descartes reminded that the student of philosophy and science not to base his conclusions upon the work of the ancients. Even knowing all of Aristotle will not make philosophers out of us. We must have originality and the capacity to discriminate between permanent and transitory knowledge. The power of judgment is not increased through academic studies. Principles can be memorized, but philosophy must be understood and digested.

3) Explain Descartes view of substances.

Ans: Descartes defines a substance as a thing that does not depend on anything else for its existence. That is to say, substance is a self-subsisting thing. Strictly speaking, then, only God is really a substance, because everything else depends on God for its existence (according to Descartes' picture, not only does God initially bring us into existence, but he must continually recreate us at every instant). More loosely speaking, though, anything that depends only on God for its existence counts as a substance.

The first thing to realize is that according to Descartes there are only three substances in the world: there is God, there is mind, and there is body. Jello is not one substance and gold another; both are the same substance of body. Since a principal attribute is the property that makes a substance the kind of substance that it is, there are also only three principal attributes: we have no idea what God's principal attribute is (if he even has one), but the principal attribute of mind is thought, and the principal attribute of body is extension.

The second important thing to realize is that the distinction between substance and principal attribute is only conceptual. That is to say, we have two concepts, (i.e. "principal attribute" and "substance") but these two concepts do not actually correspond to two different things out in the world. There is no such thing as a substance without its principal attribute. Body cannot exist without extension, and mind cannot exist without thought. This makes perfect sense when you consider that the principal attribute makes the substance what it is. How could a substance exist, Descartes asks, without being any particular kind of thing? It is impossible. In fact, not only can a substance not exist without its principal attribute (a metaphysical claim), a substance cannot even be clearly conceived without its principal attribute (an epistemological claim). How can you clearly conceive of something without clearly conceiving what sort of thing it is? The relationship between principal attribute and substance, then, is extraordinarily intimate.

The strong conceptual relationship between a substance and its principal attribute is what Descartes draws on in order to prove that the essence of mind is thought and the essence of body is extension. The proof of these claims rests on an unstated premise: P is the essence of S, if and only if I can conceive of S attributing only P to it. We can understand why Descartes would feel justified in asserting this premise given the strong conceptual relationship between a substance and its principal attribute. The principal attribute (or essence) is just that property that allows you to conceive of the substance. Whatever property that, all by itself, allows you to clearly conceive of the substance, then, must necessarily be the essence of that substance. (The full proof that thought is the essence of mind, and extension of body, will come in the next section.)

A mode, on the other hand, is much less intimately connected to a substance. A substance could exist without any particular one of its modes (though it could not exist without any modes at all). For instance, a substance could exist without being square, but it cannot exist without being shaped. A mode is actually just a particular way of *being* the principal attribute. A principal attribute is something determinable, (i.e. the property of extension or the property of thought) and a mode is a determinate way of being extended or thought (for instance, square is a way of being extended and imagining a unicorn is a way of being thought).

Like the Scholastics, Descartes claims that substances are the most basic units of existence. Where he diverges is in claiming, first, that there are only three substances and, second, that substances and their essences have such a tight connection. According to the Scholastic view there were numerous substances, all composed of various combinations of the four elements. The essence of a substance was the property that made the substance the sort of substance that it was, but aside from that important role it was no different from other properties. The further properties of a substance did not have any connection to the essence. For example, according to the Scholastics the essence of man was his rationality. However, man could also have qualities such as "pale" and "tall" that had nothing to do with this essence. In addition, according to the Scholastics, substance could survive the loss of its essence, though naturally not as that same sort of substance. So, for instance, if a man lost his rationality he would cease to be a man, but he would not cease to be a substance. He would just be a different sort of substance. It is by strengthening the connection between essence and substance that Descartes is able to so reduce the number of substances in the world. If a substance cannot be conceived of without its essence, there are very few candidates for essence and, correspondingly, few for substance. The only things we cannot conceive of are the logically impossible.

4) What are the relative substances according to Descartes?

Ans: While "I think, therefore I am" is Descartes' most famous one-liner, substance dualism is his most famous philosophical position. According to substance dualism, our minds and our bodies are two distinct substances capable of existing apart. The argument rests on the claim that the essence of mind is thought while the essence of body is extension, and this duality of essences implies a duality of corresponding substances.

The essential characteristic of a substance, which inheres in it, is called the attribute. It is a quality without which a substance cannot possibly exist. An attribute may manifest in different ways or modes. Substance and attributes can be conceived without modes, not vice versa. That is to say, substance and attribute can be conceived without modes, whereas modes cannot be conceived without substance and attributes. We cannot conceive figure without extension, nor motion except in extended space; nor imagination or will, except in a thinking thing. We can, on the other hand, conceive extension without figure or motion, and thought without imagination or sensation. The substance cannot change its attributes, but it can change its modes: the body will always be extended, but its figure need not remain the same. What, then, is the nature of external things? What we clearly and distinctly perceive in body is the essential attribute of body. Sounds, colours, taste, smell, heat and cold are not attributes of Body: we are unable to conceive these clearly and distinctly, they are confused; what we sense is not the body's true reality. The attribute of body is extension, and nothing else; Attribute of body is extension; figure is its mode. Body and extension are identical. We can conceive body without figure but not without extension. Extension is a spatial continuum of three dimensions, length, breadth, and thickness; everybody is a limited magnitude. All the processes of the external world are modifications of extensions. Body conceived as extension is passive and cannot move itself; we must, therefore construe God as the first cause of motion in the world. He is the mover. Descartes holds that God has given the world a certain amount of motion: motion is constant. Since God is immutable, all changes in the world of bodies must follow constant rules, or laws of nature. All laws of nature are laws of motion. All differences in bodies are explained by different relations of the parts: solid bodies are bodies in which the parts are united and at rest; fluids are bodies in which the parts move.

5) Explain Descartes' notion of mind and body.

Ans: Descartes maintains that we do indeed have both minds and bodies- and that the two are not ultimately one and the same thing, but rather are radically and irreducibly different sorts of thing, which exist in an intimate union. Attribute of body is extension. The attribute of mind is thinking. Body is passive while mind is active and free. These two substances are absolutely distinct.

Descartes includes will and also such higher emotions as are not the result of the union of mind and body in thought. According to Descartes, a thinking thing is one that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines as well as feels. Thought embraces everything which we now label 'consciousness' and is not restricted to the intellectual and cognitive activities of the mind. Neither extension nor figure, nor motion pertains to the thinking thing.

Descartes follows this extreme dualism between mind and body so that the nature is left free for the mechanical explanations of natural science. Mind is separated from nature with its own territory. However, this duality of mind and body puts Descartes in a difficult position. On the one hand his application of the criterion of clarity and distinction leads him to emphasize the duality of mind and body. On the other hand, he does not want to accept the conclusion that the soul is lodged in the body which it uses as an instrument. This is the conclusion that Descartes could not

accept. Empirical data went against such a conclusion, leave alone the theological objection. He was aware of the interaction between soul and body and that they in some sense constitute a unity. Descartes tries to explain this problem by locating the soul and its activity in a gland in the very center of the body. However, this localization does not solve the issue. He tries to get out of the problem finally by saying that mind and body are relative substances and dependent the absolute substance, which is God.

According to Descartes, mind and body compose a substantial unity. All the sensations just mentioned are merely confused modes of consciousness, the result of this union; man is not a pure spirit. Motion in animals, and often in ourselves, occurs without the intervention of reason; the senses excited by external objects simply react to the animal spirits and the reactions are mechanical-the animal is nothing but a machine. But in man bodily motion may produce sensations. If I were merely a thinking being, if my soul were not somehow intimately conjoined with my body, I should, for example, know that I am hungry, but not feel hungry. I should not have sensations and feelings which are confused modes of consciousness resulting from the intimate union of body and mind.

How this intimate union is to be conceived, is not made clear by Descartes and indeed, it is not possible within the framework of his dualism. Descartes warns against confounding mind and body with one another. Thought and extension are combined in man, in unity of composition but not in unity of nature: the union should not be compared with a mixture of two bodies.

Descartes suggested that the body works like a machine, that it has the material properties of extension and motion, and that it follows the laws of physics. The mind (or soul), on the other hand, was described as a nonmaterial entity that lacks extension and motion, and does not follow the laws of physics. Descartes argued that only humans have minds, and that the mind interacts with the body at the pineal gland. This form of dualism or duality proposes that the mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence the otherwise rational mind, such as when people act out of passion. Most of the previous accounts of the relationship between mind and body had been uni-directional.

Descartes suggested that the pineal gland is "the seat of the soul" for several reasons. First, the soul is unitary, and unlike many areas of the brain the pineal gland appeared to be unitary (though subsequent microscopic inspection has revealed it is formed of two hemispheres). Second, Descartes observed that the pineal gland was located near the ventricles. He believed the animal spirits of the ventricles acted through the nerves to control the body, and that the pineal gland influenced this process. Finally, Descartes incorrectly believed that only humans have pineal glands, just as, in his view, only humans have minds. This led him to the belief that animals cannot feel pain, and Descartes' practice of vivisection (the dissection of live animals) became widely used throughout Europe until the Enlightenment. Cartesian dualism set the agenda for philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem for many years after Descartes' death.

6) Briefly describe the theory of innate ideas.

Ans: Descartes distinguishes three kinds of ideas namely those that are fabricated, adventitious, or innate. Fabricated ideas are mere inventions of the mind. Accordingly, the mind can control them so that they can be examined and set aside at will and their internal content can be changed. Adventitious ideas are sensations produced by some material thing existing externally to the mind. But, unlike fabrications, adventitious ideas cannot be examined and set aside at will nor can their internal content be manipulated by the mind. For example, no matter how hard one tries, if someone is standing next to a fire, he cannot help but feel the heat as heat. He cannot set aside the sensory idea of heat by merely willing it as we can do with our idea of Santa Claus, for example. He also cannot change its internal content so as to feel something other than heat--say, cold. Finally, innate ideas are placed in the mind by God at creation. These ideas can be examined and set aside at will but their internal content cannot be manipulated. Geometrical ideas are paradigm examples of innate ideas. For example, the idea of a triangle can be examined and set aside at will, but its internal content cannot be manipulated so as to cease being the idea of a three-sided figure. Other examples of innate ideas would be metaphysical principles like "what is done cannot be undone," the idea of the mind, and the idea of God.

The aim of Descartes is to reach clear and certain knowledge, such as arises when we judge that it is impossible for a thing to be otherwise than as we conceive it. We have such necessary knowledge in the demonstrations of mathematics, and also in philosophy, if we follow the proper method. Certainty is a property of truths which are clearly and distinctly perceived. Now, certain knowledge cannot spring from the senses, for the senses do not reveal what things are in themselves, but only how they affect us. Colours, sounds, taste, odors, do not belong to the object. What the real object is, what it is when stripped of the qualities the senses ascribe to it, we can know only by clear and distinct thinking. If we cannot derive true knowledge from sense experience, if genuine knowledge is the result of reasoning from certain basic concepts and principles, these must be inherent in the mind itself- i.e., innate or a priori. The mind has its own standards or norms, which guide it in the pursuit of truth. Principles of knowledge can become explicit only in the course of experience, as the mind exercises itself in thought, but they are somehow present from the beginning. Descartes' basic idea is that reason has its natural norms; how they are present, he is not sure. By innate knowledge he means at times ideas or truths impressed upon the mind, principles which the soul finds in itself, and at other times, the native capacity of the soul to produce such knowledge in the course of human experience.

Unit -II

Spinoza : Substance, Attribute, Mode

Leibnitz : Monadology

Q.1. Does Spinoza agree with Descartes' substance?

Ans: Spinoza agreed with Descartes on some points about substance, but disagreed on others. Both Spinoza and Descartes agreed that physical things are extended things. Both Spinoza and Descartes agreed that there is only one substance, God or nature.

Q.2. What is a monad according to Leibnitz?

Ans: According to Leibniz, a "monad" is a fundamental, simple substance that makes up the universe, essentially a unique, indivisible, and immaterial entity with no parts, possessing its own internal state of perceptions and appetites, representing the entire universe from its own unique perspective; the word "monad" itself means "unity" in Greek, reflecting the idea of a single, basic building block of reality.

Q.3. What are the attributes according to Spinoza?

Ans: An attribute, according to Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way of conceiving or describing the substance. When we consider substance one way, then we conceive of its essence as extension. When we consider substance another way, then we conceive of its essence as thought.

Q.4. What are the two attributes known by human mind?

Ans: Spinoza famously claims that we, human minds, only know two attributes—Thought and Extension.

Q.5. Write a short note on Leibnitz's monadology.

Ans: There are infinite monads but each of them is as real as the single substance of Spinoza. The monads are eternal and can be destroyed only by miracle on the part of God.¹ No monad has any part and therefore is truly indivisible, but then like any ultimate reality is self-contained and exclusive of every thing else. Being a real unit, each monad contains the whole infinity of existence. It is the whole universe itself potentially. Each monad is a world in miniature.... a macrocosm in microcosm. It contains within itself the possibility of everything which happens to it. We can say, then, that it is 'freighted with the past and big with the future.' As an all-inclusive whole it mirrors the world. Every activity is reflected, either in vague or clear form, according to the nature of the monad. Again, being a self-contained unit, it excludes all other monads. Each monad is a world apart, all by itself. It has no windows through which anything might come in or go out.

The infinite number of monads are qualitatively unlike, so that no two monads are alike. They are found in a hierarchical order of existence. Each monad imperceptibly leads to others. There is no abrupt change anywhere in the connexion graduelle. Only with the help of the absolute continuity between the monads we can explain every variety of experience. Besides, with the help of the law of continuous series we can bridge the gulf between mind and matter, men and animals, conscious and unconscious states.

Monads being spiritual have two important characteristics of perception and appetition. By virtue of its perception each monad mirrors the whole infinity of existence. The more developed monad in the series has clear perception and the less developed monad has confused perception. The

infinite gradations in the monads correspond to their infinite series of perceptions. Even in the same monad, according to its own stages of development, there are different degrees of perception. Because each monad is a force, therefore, it has appetite by virtue of which it tends to become the whole. Again, by virtue of its appetite each monad tends to pass from obscure to clear perception. If an action is done from very obscure perception then it is known as impulse and if it is done from clear perception, then it is known as will. Thus the activity of the low monads is purely random and impulsive, but in the higher monads the activity is prompted by will and desire. However the distinction between impulse and desire is one of degree and, not of kind.

The monads are found in a continuous series, one imperceptibly passing into the other. However, in this series we can note the main types of monads. The lowest or bare monads are those in which the perception is most obscure. They go to make the inorganic bodies. They are scarcely more than centres of forces and they express themselves in the form of motion which appears to us purely mechanical. They may be said to be in profound stupor or deep sleep. Then there are conscious monads endowed with memory. This may be called souls. They go to make the plant and animal world. However, the highest monads are called spirits having reason and universal, necessary knowledge. They are raised to the knowledge of the self as well as of God.

The Cartesians called spirits alone as souls but called the former two namely, bare monads and animals, automata. However, the difference between the monads is one of degree. In the bare monads the force appears only in the form of mechanical movement; in the animal the appetite is expressed in the form of instincts; and in the spirits the force is found in the form of self-conscious desire and will. In this hierarchical order the higher includes the lower. The self-consciousness emerges out of consciousness and includes certain perceptions which remain obscure. Only in this way Leibnitz hopes to reconcile necessity with freedom.

Q.6. Explain briefly substance, attributes and modes as advocated by Spinoza.

Ans: According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a mode. A *substance* is something that needs nothing else in order to exist or be conceived. Substances are independent entities both conceptually and ontologically. A *mode* or property is something that needs a substance in order to exist, and cannot exist without a substance. For example, being furry, orange, hungry, angry, etc. are modes that need a substance which is furry, orange, hungry, angry, etc. Hunger and patches of orange color cannot exist floating around on their own, but rather, hunger and patches of orange color need something (namely, a substance) to *be* hungry and *have* the orange color. Hunger and colors are, therefore, dependent entities or modes.

This one substance has an infinite number of *attributes*. An attribute is simply an essence; a “what it is to be” that kind of thing. According to Descartes, every substance has only one attribute: bodies have only the attribute of extension, and minds have only the attribute of thought. Spinoza, however, argues against this claim that the one substance is absolutely infinite and so it must exist in every way that something can exist. Thus, he infers that the one substance must have an infinite number of attributes. An attribute, according to Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way of conceiving or describing the substance. When we consider substance one way, then we conceive of its essence as extension. When we consider substance another way, then we conceive of its essence as thought. While substance has an infinite number of different attributes, Spinoza argues that human beings only know about two of them: extension and thought.

If Spinoza's Substance Monism Argument were sound, it would prove that the only substance which exists is God or Nature. But why does this one substance have any finite modes (properties)? Here Spinoza argues that "from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways". Spinoza argues that the greater something is, the greater the number of properties which follow from its nature or essence. For example, it follows from the nature of a triangle that it has three sides. Why do triangles have interior angles of 180 degrees? Because of the kind of things that they are .

The greater the essence of the thing, the more properties that follow from it. God's essence is the greatest possible essence. Thus, the greatest possible number of properties must follow from God's essence or nature. Thus, an infinite number of finite modes must follow from the essence of God in just the way that certain properties of triangles (having interior angles of 180 degrees, for example) follow from the essence of a triangle. Because a triangle's essence is finite only a finite number of properties follow from it; because God's essence is infinite an infinite number of properties follow from it. Human beings, chairs, tables, cats, dogs, trees, etc. are some of the properties that follow from God's essence or nature.

Spinoza claims that one important consequence of this proof is that modes are properties of substance. The view that modes are properties of substance has been denied by at least one prominent interpreter of Spinoza. Curley's view has, however, proven unpopular. The dominant interpretation today is that modes are properties of the one substance.

Spinoza's theory of the attributes is the most original, difficult, and controversial aspect of his metaphysics. According to Descartes, the attribute of a substance is simply the substance's essence. Given this definition, Descartes infers that each substance has only one attribute. Spinoza modifies Descartes's definition and states that "by attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence." Spinoza then claims that the one substance has an infinite number of attributes. A number of scholars have found it hard to understand how one substance could have multiple attributes each one of which is "what the intellect perceives ... as constituting its essence." Either Spinoza is claiming that the one substance has multiple essences, or that the attributes are not really the essence of the substance but only seem to be.

The interpretive problems with Spinoza's theory of attributes begin with his definition. In the definition he uses the word '*tanquam*' which can be correctly translated into English both as 'as if' and as 'as.' If '*tanquam*' is translated as 'as if', then that translation suggests that the attributes are not really the essence of substance but only seem to be the essence of substance. If, however, '*tanquam*' is translated as 'as', then that translation would seem to indicate that each attribute really is the essence of substance. The problem is then to explain how we can have one substance with more than one essence. Thus, the first problem with Spinoza's theory of attributes is to explain the relation between the attributes and the essence of substance.

The second problem with Spinoza's theory of attributes is to explain how the attributes are related to one other. If each attribute really is the essence of the one substance, then how do they relate to each other? Are they identical? Or is each attribute really different from every other attribute? If they are identical, then why does the intellect distinguish them? If they are different, then how can one substance have more than one essence? Some subjectivists argue that there is really only one attribute which is distinguished wrongly into numerous attributes by the intellect. Objectivists, on the other hand, argue that there is more than one attribute and that they are really distinct from each other.

Q.7. What are Spinoza's main ideas?

Ans: 1. Rationalism: Spinoza was a rationalist who prioritized reason and judgment over opinion and superstition. 2. Determinism: Spinoza believed that free will was an illusion. For Spinoza, the natural laws of the universe dictate a cause-and-effect relationship that is beyond human understanding or control.

Q.8. What are the three types of knowledge according to Spinoza?

Ans: The article closely follows Spinoza's threefold division of the different types of knowledge as presented in his *Ethics*. This threefold division is constituted by the distinctions among imagination, intuition, and the exercise of the intellect.

Q.9. Did Spinoza believe in God?

Ans: Yes, Baruch Spinoza believed in a God, but it was a very different concept from the traditional Judeo-Christian God. Spinoza's God is immanent, infinite, and eternal, and is the foundation of his philosophical vision.

Q.10. What is the theory of Spinoza?

Ans: Spinoza's thesis, that the essence of any finite mode – including any human mind – is a striving (conatus) to persevere in being, is an attempt to give an account of nature under which human beings, with their apparent peculiarities, are nevertheless natural.

Q.11. What was Leibniz's theory?

Ans: A polymath and one of the founders of calculus, Leibniz is best known philosophically for his metaphysical idealism; his theory that reality is composed of spiritual, non-interacting “monads,” and his oft-ridiculed thesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds.

Q.12. What is God according to Leibniz?

Ans: The essence of God can be thought of as “the conjunction in the same subject of all possible absolute forms or perfections.”²³ According to Leibniz, God contains an infinity of such Ideas or forms. We saw above that, for many theists, every product of God contains the divine essence.

Q.13. What is the concept in Leibniz?

Ans: Leibniz's logical conception of the nature of substance, according to which each individual substance has a concept so complete that it contains all predicates true of it past, present, and future (or from which all its predicates are deducible), also seems to push him to endorse a strong version of essentialism.

Q.14. What is the philosophy of Leibniz?

Ans: Leibniz states in several texts that our reasonings are based on two fundamental principles: the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Human beings also have access to several additional innate truths and principles, for instance those of logic, mathematics, ethics, and theology.

Unit-III

Locke : Refutation of Innate Ideas, Representationalism

Berkeley : Subjective Idealism

Hume : Skepticism

1. Write two points on refutation of innate ideas by Locke.

Ans. First, if there are innate ideas, they must be equally present in all minds. But Locke contends that there are no such ideas which are universally present in all minds. Secondly, if there were innate ideas in the mind, they must be the same in all minds. But the so-called innate ideas of God, morality and the like differ in different societies and in different ages.

2. What is meant by innate ideas? How does Locke refute the doctrine of innate ideas? Discuss.

Ans. According to some rationalist philosophers, certain knowledge can be derived from some innate or a priori ideas. It is Descartes who first mentioned innate ideas. These innate ideas, according to Descartes are implanted in the human mind by God at the time of birth. They are self-evident. They are clear and distinct. Clearness and distinctness of ideas are the test of their truth. The idea of causality, infinity, perfect being or God and the like are innate ideas.

Locke has severely criticised Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas. He has put forward the following arguments in favour of his view:

- (a) If there were innate ideas, then they would be equally present in all minds. But there are no such ideas which are universally present in all minds. Children, idiots and insane persons are not aware of any such ideas.
- (b) If there were really innate ideas in the mind, they would be the same in all minds. But the so-called innate ideas of God, morality and the like differ in different societies and in different ages.
- (c) Even if there were the same ideas in all minds, it would not make them innate on that account. Universality of an idea does not prove its innateness.
- (d) The so-called innate ideas are general truths which are generalisations from particular facts of experience. The so-called a priori rational principles of the rationalists are really derived from experience. The reason of man is not provided with any innate idea.
- (e) If the only way to acquire knowledge were to derive conclusions from self-evident, innate and general principles, then no progress of knowledge would be possible, because stock of knowledge we possess will not be enriched by new information. Thus, Locke concludes that no ideas are innate, for no ideas are universal. Locke says that those who think that at the beginning innate ideas remain implicit and then become explicit, then they would agree that it will be true of all our ideas.

3. Why Locke's theory of realism is called Representationalism?

Ans. Locke's realism is called Representationalism because this theory maintains that mind does not know external things directly, but only through their representations or copies which are ideas

in our mind. Our consciousness is like a screen on which are represented the images of the external world.

4. Why Locke's realism is called Scientific Realism?

Ans. Realism of Locke is based on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects. This distinction is very much consistent with scientific outlook. This distinction was also admitted by scientists of his time. That is why Locke's realism is called Scientific Realism.

5. How does Berkeley's try to refute Locke's distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities?

Ans. Berkeley put forward the following arguments to refute the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities: (i) If the secondary qualities like colour, smell.etc. cannot exist apart from our sensibility, and hence merely subjective modes our consciousness, the so-called primary qualities of extension, weight etc. cannot exist except in relation to our sensibility, and hence are subjective. (ii) The primary qualities like the secondary qualities vary from individual to individual. An object appears big from a short distance, but appears small from a long distance. Again, what is heavy to one person is light to another. Thus, primary qualities are not objective but ideas in our mind like the secondary qualities.

6. Why is Berkeley's idealism called subjective idealism?

Ans. Berkeley's idealism is called subjective idealism because his theory denies the reality of the external objects and reduces them to the subjective ideas of the finite minds. He holds that the existence of objects depends on the perception of individual knowing mind.

7. What is the distinction between subjective idealism and objective idealism?

Ans. According to subjective idealism, the existence of the external objects depends on the perception of knowing mind. Objective idealism, on the other hand, holds that the world and its objects have existence independently of knowing mind. Berkeley is the advocate of subjective idealism. Hegel and some other later philosophers like Bradley, Green and others are known as objective idealists.

8. What is representationalism? Explain representationalism as a theory of reality. Or, Explain Locke's theory of scientific realism.

Ans. Representationalism admits the reality of the external world and maintains that the existence of this external world is no way dependent upon being known by a mind. But this theory holds that we obtain the knowledge of the external things only through their representations or copies which are ideas in our minds. John Locke is the advocate of representationalism.

Locke's theory of representative realism is based upon his distinction of qualities of things into primary and secondary. Primary qualities, according to Locke, belong to the external physical things and entirely independent of the mind that perceives them. Primary qualities are real and objective qualities. Solidity, extension, motion etc. are examples of primary qualities.

Secondary qualities do not belong to things. They exist only in the consciousness of the subject as sensations and ideas. Secondary qualities are subjective. Colour, smell, taste etc. are examples of secondary qualities. Locke's theory is known as representationalism because according to his theory, mind never perceives anything external to itself. Mind can perceive only its own ideas, its

own states and processes. Our consciousness is like a screen on which the copies of the external objects are reflected as ideas. The ideas are representations or images of the qualities of real things which are external to the mind. External objects exist independent of the ways of our knowing but we know them indirectly through ideas. We know external objects through the ideas which they produce in our mind. Ideas are the direct objects of knowledge. When ideas in the mind agree with the original objects, we have real knowledge, and when there is no such agreement, our knowledge is unreal.

Locke's theory is called Scientific Realism, because he was influenced by the scientific thoughts of his time. His classification of primary and secondary qualities was also admitted by scientific views of his time. Since Locke's realism is based on a critical analysis, it is also called 'Critical Realism'.

9. What is idealism? What are its different forms? Explain briefly Berkeley's subjective idealism.

Ans. Idealism is a theory which denies the reality of external objects independent of the knowing mind. The knowledge of objects depends on our mind. They are minddependent. There are different forms of idealism. These are - (1) Subjective Idealism, (2) Phenomenalistic Idealism, (3) Objective Idealism. Berkeley may be said to be founder of idealism in modern period. (His idealism arose as a logical consequence of the unpsychological distinction of qualities into primary and secondary qualities by Locke.

Berkeley developed the empiricism of Locke to its logical consequence in idealism. He does not admit the existence of Locke's substance and considers matters as a cluster of qualities. All qualities of matter, both primary and secondary are nothing but subjective states of ideas of our minds Berkeley argues that the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived, 'esse est percipi'. If all knowledge comes from experience as Locke holds, we know nothing but the ideas of our minds, since what we perceive is an idea of the mind.

What we call an external object is nothing but the idea or experience of our mind. (Objects have no existence apart from their relation to our sensibility. They have no existence apart from the mind that knows them) There can be no object without a subject to know it, - no existence without a consciousness of it. To be or to exist is to be perceived or known. (In Berkeley's word - *esse est percipi*, i.e., existence is equal to perception) Now, if Berkeley is right in saying that a thing cannot exist unless perceived or known, then the question arises how can we assert the existence of a thing when it is not being perceived by any mind?

To solve this problem (Berkeley has introduced God or the Infinite Mind. Berkeley said that when we are not perceiving an object lying on the world it is sustained by God's perception. So when no one perceives an object it continues to exist as idea in the Infinite Mind.) In this way Berkeley accounts for the continued existence of objects by introducing the concept of God. If we are not ready to accept such introduction of God, the world will be reduced to the mental states of an individual mind and then it will be logically reduced to solipsism.

10. Is Berkeley's idealism subjective or objective? Discuss.

Ans. Subjective idealism holds the view that our minds and their ideas are the only realities and there is no world outside. What we call an external object is nothing but idea or experience of our mind. Objects have no existence apart from the mind that knows them.

Objective idealism, on the other hand, maintains that the existence of the world is not dependent on the individual mind. The world is the expression of the Absolute which is Thought or Mind. The world is the object of the Absolute Mind. From the above distinction between subjective idealism and objective idealism, it may be said that Berkeley's idealism lacks that fuller connotation which Hegel's objective idealism has acquired. Berkeley has held that only individual mind and its ideas exist.

There is no extra-mental reality existing independently of the knowing mind. This position of Berkeley reduces him to subjective idealism. The world and its qualities are nothing but perceptions or ideas of our minds. It cannot be said that objects may exist as ideas in the minds of other persons when they are not being perceived by me. The existence of other finite minds must also be an idea of my mind. So from the earlier writings of Berkeley it appears that the logical conclusions of his theory should be-I and my mental ideas alone exist. The world becomes reduced to the mental states of an individual mind, and this is subjective idealism. But in the latter form of his idealism, Berkeley has made all objects ideas of God's mind for solving the problem of their permanence and extra-mental reality.

Objects continue to exist as ideas of God's mind when no one perceives them. We perceive only the ideas of God. This second phase of Berkeley's idealism may be regarded as objective. In the history of Western philosophy Berkeley's idealism is known as subjective idealism. Objective idealism of Hegel consists in regarding reality as Absolute Idea or Thought or Mind. This absolute idea by its self-differentiation and self-objectification makes itself into the world of things and minds. The relation between the Absolute idea and the world of things and mind is such that one cannot exist without the other. If these be the fundamental points in the conception of objective idealism, we cannot call Berkeley's idealism objective because he did not make God the beginning and end of the universe. He did not hold the universe to be self-differentiation of God. Berkeley was fundamentally a subjective idealist.

11. What was Hume's skepticism about causation?

Ans: Simply put, Hume was skeptical of causality. He believed causality was not necessarily empirically sound because it is the subjective mind that assumes there is a cause-and-effect based on past experiences.

12. Why Hume is called a sceptic?

Ans. Hume as a thorough-going empirist rejects the idea of material substance, soul and God as we have no evidence for their existence in our experience. Hume rejects all metaphysical entities. He admits only particular and contingent truths which are given by experience. Thus, Hume has landed himself in scepticism.

13. What is the philosophy of skepticism?

Ans: Philosophical skepticism is the view that some or all knowledge is impossible. A skeptic questions the possibility of knowledge—particularly justification—in some domain. A global skeptic rejects the possibility of knowledge in general. But one need not reject the possibility of all knowledge.

14. Write a note on Hume's theory of causation.

Ans: One of the most influential figures in the realm of skepticism is David Hume, a Scottish philosopher born in 1711. Hume's philosophical empiricism, centered on the role of experience in shaping human knowledge, has left an indelible mark on modern philosophy. Here's a closer look at Hume's contributions to skepticism:

Empirical Skepticism

Hume's skepticism revolves around the idea that all human knowledge is rooted in empirical experiences. He argued that we cannot have knowledge of metaphysical concepts, such as the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, because they lie beyond the realm of empirical experience.

Causation Skepticism

Perhaps Hume's most famous contribution is his exploration of causation. He questioned our ability to establish a necessary connection between cause and effect based solely on our observations. According to Hume, we cannot directly observe causation; instead, we observe regular sequences of events. This led to his assertion that our belief in causation is based on custom and habit rather than reason.

Problem of Induction

Hume introduced the problem of induction, which challenges our capacity to make predictions about the future based on past experiences. He argued that there is no rational justification for assuming that the future will resemble the past, despite our observations of regular patterns in the past.

Unit-IV

Kant : Synthetic Apriori Judgments, Categories of Understanding, Transcendental Deduction

1. What are the faculties of knowing according to Kant?

Ans. Kant divides the faculty of knowing into three subordinate faculties - the sensibility by which objects are perceived in space and time; the understanding by which they are known; and the reason by which the mind attempts to form Ideas or Noumena.

2. Why is it said that Kant brought copernican revolution in philosophy?

Ans. Philosophers before Kant assumed that our perceptions correspond to characteristics in the external world. But Kant, on the contrary, maintains that all objects in order to be known by us must conform to the constitution of our minds. Kant's famous saying "The understanding makes nature" has brought in a Copernican revolution in philosophy. In knowledge, instead of mind conforming to an independent nature, it is nature, that conforms to mind.

3. Explain briefly Kant's critical theory of knowledge. Or, How does Kant reconcile empiricism and rationalism?

Ans. Immanuel Kant has propounded his critical theory of knowledge in his famous book 'Critique of Pure Reason'. He seeks to reconcile the two opposite theories of empiricism and rationalism. The former puts emphasis only on sense-experience and the latter on reason alone for acquirement of true knowledge. Kant distinguishes between the matter and forms of knowledge. The matter of knowledge is supplied by experience.

The forms of knowledge are supplied by reason. According to Kant, human mind receives sensations from without through the senses. These sensations are discrete and isolated from one another. They are called by Kant the 'manifold of intuitions'. They are the matter of knowledge. They cannot give us any knowledge unless they are connected with one another by the synthetic activity of the mind. It applies its own forms, categories and ideas to them and builds up a system of knowledge out of them. The form of knowledge comprises the forms of sensibility. Sensibility applies its forms of perception, viz. space and time to the disconnected sensations produced in our mind by the things-in-themselves, and converts them into intelligible objects. Space and time are called forms of sensibility or intuition.

The understanding applies its categories viz., substance, causality, unity, plurality etc. to the sensations arranged in space and time by sensibility. The forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding do not apply in things-in-themselves or noumena. They apply to phenomena or appearance only. Both sensibility and understanding are inseparably present in every experience, and neither can operate in isolation from the other. Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty. Sensations arranged in space and time by sensibility and subsumed under the categories of understanding are co-ordinated by reason. When reason applies these a priori forms of knowledge to the discrete sensations supplied by experience and organises and interprets them, we have knowledge. In this way Kant points out that in the origin of knowledge there are contributions of both sense-experience and reason.

4. What is substance according to Kant?

Ans. A substance is neither an objective entity nor merely a cluster of sensations and ideas, but it is an a priori category of the understanding, which is involved and presupposed in our experience of change.

5. Why Kant says that space and time are empirically real but transcendently ideal?

Ans. Space and time, according to Kant are a priori forms of perception through which we arrange the manifold of impressions produced by things-in-themselves in our mind into a spatial and temporal world. The a priori forms of space and time apply to phenomena. In this sense they are empirically real. They are transcendently ideal because they cannot be applied to things-in-themselves or noumena.

6. Write a note on Kant's theory of transcendental deduction.

Ans: Kant's Immanuel Kant, through his philosophical enterprise known as critical idealism or transcendental idealism, has made an attempt to resolve the issues emerging from the conflict between rationalistic and empiricist approaches by proposing a system that was fundamentally a priori but without sacrificing the value of the phenomenal reality. According to his approach, the reality that human beings know is basically the reality constituted or constructed by human beings themselves. In a nutshell, with the help of a set of a priori forms and the phenomenal data, the world – all sciences and all forms of knowledge – is shaped. The same is the case with regard to

the practical sphere: the autonomous individual, through the proper exercise of the will, constructs the moral world. So, the Kantian approach to theoretical as well as practical knowledge is centred on the individual agent. Kant's definitive insistence that we can have a priori knowledge, which is necessary and universal, however, does not blind him to the contributions of the senses.

He holds that all our knowledge is ultimately rooted in sense intuitions as well as in concepts; all the same, he categorically denies that we could have theoretical knowledge about anything that lies beyond the bounds of possible experience. Thus, in the Prolegomena, Kant claims that "the word 'transcendental' ... does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended to make cognition of experience possible". It is in this sense that he calls his philosophy transcendental. An inquiry into the nature of knowledge is, therefore, an inquiry into the cognitive constitution of the subject, and not into the nature of the objects, but concerns only what makes it possible. Hence, he defines his philosophy as "a science of the mere examination of reason, its sources and limits".

Understood negatively, according to Beck, it highlights the 'police' function of the Critique "in preventing or exposing the dialectical illusions of speculative metaphysics", while, understood positively, it secures to reason the "sure path of science" in the wake of the challenges from rationalism and empiricism. Thus, practically speaking, the Critique becomes the final court of appeal for Kant, even to the extent of becoming a limiting factor in his further philosophical endeavour. The unifying thought that runs through the whole of the Critique is his self-proclaimed novel question "How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?".

To begin with, Kant assumes that synthetic a priori propositions exist both in pure mathematics and physics, and his conviction about the success of these branches of knowledge impels him to invest himself in critical inquiry with a view to justify the possibility of such propositions in the realms of knowledge and morality. Thus, the critical problem, which he formulates against the backdrop of dogmatic and empiricist philosophies, unravels in the first Critique by posing the problem of whether and to what extent can we find a priori principles of knowledge in the respective faculties of reason, understanding, and judgment.

As for the claims of the Critique itself, the apparent transcendent nature of a priori knowledge is rectified, and its concreteness safeguarded by Kant, by his incessant insistence that "we come to know of a priori ideas, like all other ideas, only through experience ... that this a priori knowledge nevertheless must apply to object of experience...". This is possible, he claims, not as a result of the independent nature of the things, but due to the nature of the intellectual faculties. This step, according to Kant, ensures both the purity and validity of transcendental knowledge, which "entitles him to develop the entire system of pure speculative reason without reference to anything other than the abstract principles" and "without reference to any specific empirical object".

7. What is Kant's synthetic a priori Judgement?

Ans: It is the judgment synthetic a priori which, according to Kant, can account simultaneously for universal certainty and increase of knowledge. The synthetic a priori is the hybrid proposition' which combines the merits of both the parental propositions-i.e. synthetic and analytic.

8. What does Kant's synthetic a priori have to do with Hume?

Ans: Hume limits legitimate forms of argument to two: probable arguments, which establish matters of fact, and demonstrative arguments, which establish relations of ideas. Kant challenges

this dichotomy. He argues that there are synthetic a priori propositions that are neither matters of fact nor relations of ideas.

9. How does Kant define understanding?

Ans: Kant viewed understanding as the process in which intuitions (information gained from the senses) is synthesized with a priori concepts. This synthesis would result in the completed phenomenal object.

10. What is the categorical imperative in understanding?

Ans: One of Kant's categorical imperatives is the universalizability principle, in which one should "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." In lay terms, this simply means that if you do an action, then everyone else should also be able to do it.

11. What is Kant's sensibility and understanding?

Ans: Sensibility generates representations based on being affected either by entities distinct from the subject or by the subject herself. This is in contrast to the faculty of understanding, which generates conceptual representations spontaneously – i.e. without advertence to affection.

12. What do Kant's categories of understanding?

Ans: Kant's categories of understanding helped explain how we think and learn. He showed that our mind is an active part of how we see the world. Without these categories, our mind would be confused and unable to understand things clearly. He taught us that we don't see the world in a simple way; our mind shapes it.

13. What does categorical mean in Kant's understanding of the categorical imperative?

Ans: Categorical imperative, in the ethics of the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, founder of critical philosophy, a rule of conduct that is unconditional or absolute for all agents, the validity or claim of which does not depend on any desire or end.

14. What is the principle of Kant's categorical imperative?

Ans: Kant's ethics are organized around the notion of a "categorical imperative," which is a universal ethical principle stating that one should always respect the humanity in others, and that one should only act in accordance with rules that could hold for everyone.

15. What is the good will and categorical imperative Kant?

Ans: For Kant, a moral agent has a good will insofar as they act consistently from duty. To act from duty is to follow the moral law, also known as the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative commands us to act only in ways that could rationally be made into universal laws.

16. Write a note on Kant's synthetic a priori judgment.

Ans: From a logical point of view, the propositions that express human knowledge can be divided according to two distinctions. 1) Distinction between propositions that are a priori, in the sense that they are knowable prior to experience. Necessity and Universality are the two criteria of a

priori propositions and both of these criteria are inseparable. By 'strict universality' means 'true in all possible world.'

A posteriori propositions are those that they are knowable only after experience. 2) Distinction between propositions that are analytic, that is, those in which the predicate is included in the subject. For example, "All bodies are extended." If we understand the meaning of the term 'material body' whose connotation was taken by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz to be extension, then certainly the predicate 'extended' is already contained in the subject. And a synthetic proposition is one in which the predicate is not included in the subject. E.g. Material bodies are heavy. Whether a body is heavy or not is known through experience. The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic is based on the content of propositions.

Here the question is: "Does the proposition add or does not add to cognition or knowledge?" If it does, it is called synthetic, if it does not, it is called analytic. However, the distinction of a priori and a posteriori propositions has reference to the sources of cognition. A priori propositions stem from pure reason or pure understanding. As such they are valid independently of any experience whatsoever. A posteriori propositions, on the other hand, are derived from experience. They, therefore, require experience for their validation. For the most of the empiricists, a priori and the analytic propositions, and, a posteriori and the synthetic propositions are identical. But, for Kant, synthetic propositions instead of being a posteriori may be a priori.

For the empiricists and rationalists, who are unanimous in claiming that the analytical propositions are a priori in their nature, they are absurd and self-contradictory and consequently nonsense. For Kant, however, synthetic propositions a priori are most significant in scientific cognition and are found in mathematics and in physics. For example: $5+7$ are together equal to 12. It is universal, necessary and a priori in mathematics. Every event has a cause. Although it is not part of the concept of an event that it be a cause, it is universally true and necessary that every event has a cause. These judgements or propositions are synthetic as they explain the progress of science and they are a priori as they explain the universal aspect of scientific knowledge.

17. Write a note on Kant's categories of understanding.

Ans: The apriori, formal, normative idea of the freedom/ontology and equality of all moral agents, Kant argues, is the "Categorical Imperative" of pure practical reason, which, he maintains, can and should be used to assess or test the morality of our maxims of action. He gives several formulations of the Categorical Imperative, which, in any of its formulations, is, in his view, the supreme principle of pure practical reason or rational will. His three major formulations are presented below. The first formulation (Universal -Law Formulation) is made from the standpoint of the moral agent. It states: Act only on that maxim, which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. A variant of the first formulation (which can be referred to as the Universal-Law-of-Formulation) reads as follows: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature. The second formulation (End -in -Itself

Formulation) is made from the standpoint of those who are affected by (or, in other words, those who are the recipients of) our actions.

It reads: I So act that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. The third formulation (Kingdom -of-Ends Formulation) views the agents and their recipients as I ; forming a moral community of self-legislating moral actors. It states: All maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to harmonise with a possible: kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.

The Categorical Imperative of practical reason, says Kant, is "categorical" in that it is not hypothetical or conditional to the particular wishes or inclinations of this or that moral agent or cultural community. For Kant, morality is not what produces good for ourselves or for others, but what has to be done as an absolute or categorical duty -a duty arising from the presuppositions or n priori (inherent or pre -given) structure of our practical reason or rational will. To act morally, in other words, is to act out of a sense of duty, i.e., out of respect for the Moral Law or the Categorical Imperative, and not out of considerations of self-interest, instrumental rationality (as taught by Hobbes) or the protection of any natural right to private property (as taught by Locke), In this respect, Kant's moral and political philosophy marks a major departure from that of Hobbes and Locke.

Unit-V

Hegel and Marx : Dialectical Method Marx's concept of Alienation

1. What is Hegel's dialectical approach?

Ans: Hegel's dialectic method focuses on ideas and thoughts, and he proposed that the solution to problems with material things was to reanalyze these things, arriving at a synthesized new idea of the thing's essence.

2. What are the 3 parts of Hegel's dialectic?

Ans: Hegel presents the dialectic as a three-part structure consisting of a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis. In human history, when the status quo (the thesis) is challenged by a new historical development or force (the antithesis), a new form of life emerges out of the synthesis of the two prior stages.

3. What is the dialectic of Hegel Marx?

Ans: In the works of both Hegel and Marx two types of dialectical method are at play: a historical and a systematic type. The systematic type scrutinises the architecture of a given system, while the historical type scrutinises the mechanism by which a system develops into another system.

4. What is the difference between Marxist and Hegelian?

Ans: Like Hegel, Marx adopted a “directional” view of history; but, whereas Hegel had tended to exhibit it as representing the unfolding in time of an inner spiritual principle, Marx looked elsewhere for the ultimate determinants of its course and character.

5. How does Marx apply Hegel's dialectic?

Ans: Karl Marx adopted Hegel's dialectic by changing it from a focus on ideas to a focus on material conditions and social structures. While Hegel believed that history progresses through the clash of ideas (thesis, antithesis, synthesis), Marx applied this concept to real-life conflicts between social classes.

6. Why did Marx reject Hegel?

Ans: The main reason Marx opposed Hegel's passive attitude is that Marx thought our ideas are shaped by material circumstances. According to Marx, the economic base – the relations of production – predominantly influences the superstructure – culture, science, ideology, religion, politics, etc. – of a society.

7. What does Marx say about alienation?

Ans: In alienated labour, Marx claims, humans are reduced to the level of an animal, working only for the purpose of filling a physical gap, producing under the compulsion of direct physical need. Alienation from my life-activity also means that my life-activity is directed by another.

8. What are the 4 types of alienation according to Marx?

Ans: The four dimensions of alienation identified by Marx are alienation from: (1) the product of labor, (2) the process of labor, (3) others, and (4) self. Class experiences usually fit easily into these categories.

9. What is the conclusion of alienation by Karl Marx?

Ans: Marx's theory of alienation provides a powerful framework for analyzing the human condition under capitalism. It challenges us to consider how economic systems shape our experiences, relationships, and sense of self.

10. How did Karl Marx explain alienation?

Ans: Marx stated that in a capitalist society, workers are alienated from their labour - they cannot decide on their own productive activities, nor can they use or own the value of what they produce.

11. Write a note on Marx's alienation.

Ans: Marx's exposition of the functioning and prospects of capitalist economy cannot be studied in isolation from his anthropological ideas and his philosophy of history. His theory is a general one embracing the whole of human activity in its various interdependent spheres. His successive writings culminating in capital itself are more and more elaborate versions of the same thought which may be expressed as follows: “we live in an age in which the dehumanisation of man, that is to say the alienation between him and his own works, is growing to a climax which must end in a revolutionary upheaval; this will originate from the particular interest of the class which has suffered the most from dehumanisation, but its effect would be to restore humanity to all mankind”. The fundamental novelty of capital consists in two points, which entail wholly different view of

capitalist society from that of the classical economists: a) what the worker sells is not his labour but labour power, and that labour has two aspects – abstract and concrete.

Exploitation consists in the worker selling his labour power and thus divesting himself of his own essence; the labour process and its results become hostile and alien, deprivation of humanity instead of fulfillment. b) Marx, having discovered the dual nature of labour as expressed in the opposition between exchange value and use value, defines capitalism as a system in which the sole object of production is to increase exchange value without limit. The whole of human activity is subordinated to a non-human purpose, the creation of something that man cannot as such assimilate for only use-value can be assimilated.

The whole community is thus enslaved to its own products, abstractions which present themselves to it as an external, alien power. The deformation of consciousness and the alienation of the political superstructure are consequences of the basic alienation of labour – which, however, is not a ‘mistake’ on history’s part but a necessary precondition of the future society of free beings in control of the vital process of their own lives. In this way, Capital may be regarded as a logical continuation of Marx’s earlier views. 1) Alienation is nothing but a process in which man deprives himself of what he truly is, of his own humanity. 2) Marx unlike Hegel did not identify alienation with externalisation, i.e. the labour process whereby human strength and skill are converted into new products. It would be absurd to speak of abolishing alienation in this sense, since in all imaginable circumstances, men will have to expend energy to produce the things they need. Hegel identified alienation with externalisation and could therefore conceive man’s final reconciliation with the world by way of abolishing the objectivity of the object.

To Marx however, the fact that people ‘objectivize’ their powers does not mean they become poorer by whatever they produce; on the contrary, labour in itself is an affirmation and not a denial of humanity being the chief form of the unending process of man’s self-creation. It is only in a society ruled by private property and division of labour that productive activity is a source of misery and dehumanisation. And labour destroys the workman instead of enriching him. When alienated labour is done away with, people will continue to externalise and ‘objectivize’ their power, but they will be able to assimilate the work of their hands as an expression of their collective ability.

12. Explain Hegel’s dialectic method.

Ans: After Greek philosophers, it was German idealist thinkers who worked on Dialectic method in an apperceptive fashion. While Kant used dialectics as a principle of self-contradiction, Fichte made use of it to explain his evolution of self-consciousness and for the first time used the thesiantithesis-synthesis triode. Schelling fully developed dialectics as a method that explains the phenomenon of nature and utilised the triadic method. Based on Schelling, it was Hegel who worked out a complete system of the world through speculative reasoning. He wanted to have the fullest knowledge of past, present and future through this system.

Hegel’s system has many similarities with that of Adi Sankara, whose doctrine of Brahman also captures the eternal knowledge. Hegel argues that "what is rational is real and what is real is rational." This must be understood in terms of Hegel's further claim that the Absolute must ultimately be regarded as pure Thought, or Spirit, or Mind, in the process of self-development. According to Hegel’s system, beginning of history happens with the beginning of the primitive Spirit or Absolute Being. This Spirit was so poor and simple that when it had faced its anti-thesis

i.e. nothingness and in a perennial and conflictual movement, the synthesis is produced i.e. Becoming. In an unlimited series of phenomena, the Being constructs itself continuously and becomes more conscious about itself. The perennial movement between the opposites i.e. the Being and non-Being make selfconstruction and self-revelation possible. This reality, or the total developmental process of everything that is, he referred to as Absolute Spirit.

According to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to chart the development of Absolute Spirit. This involves (1) making clear the internal rational structure of the Absolute; (2) demonstrating the manner in which the Absolute manifests itself in nature and human history; and (3) explicating the teleological nature of the Absolute, that is, showing the end or purpose toward which the Absolute is directed. Being, in other words, is characterized in its development by three stages: being (thesis), non-being (antithesis), becoming (synthesis). It is in this that Hegel's system of triads consists. This higher entity, at the same time it becomes being, is lacerated, so to speak, by its opposite (i.e., by non-being), and tends to affirm itself in a still higher entity, and so on ad infinitum. This activity of building and of tearing itself apart, with the intention of rebuilding itself ad infinitum, is the life of Being.

Another important feature of the primordial Being is rationality. It was essentially a perfect, rational thought that confirms the development of Being in the dialectic process that confirms the series of phenomena. This thesis of the World as nothing but 'Becoming' helped Hegel to challenge the Aristotelian logic. According to Aristotle, the principle of identity could be formulated because the concept of being is always the same -- A is equal to A, and A cannot be its negation (non-A) at the same time and in the same respect.

For Hegel, this logic is faulty because it misinterprets reality. For him reality is never identical with itself, but at every moment changes, passing from what it is to what it is not. Contradiction, therefore, is the life of concrete being. The progress of history happened through a logical process of developing in accordance with the law of coincidence of opposites. This process depends upon a fundamental triad: Idea (Logos), Nature, Spirit. This triad indicates a logical rather than a chronological succession, for the entire process is actuated within the primordial Spirit, in which all is immanent. Idea or Logos is the system of the pure concept which lay at the foundation of all reality. Nature is the objectivation of the Idea. It is the Idea's becoming other than itself, or its self-extension in time and space.

But it is the Universal Spirit which establishes itself in the series of phenomena extended in space and time, with the purpose of developing itself and of gaining consciousness of self. Nature reaches the height of perfection in the human organism, and the human organism attains the peak of perfection in individual consciousness or Subjective Spirit. With the attainment of this supreme stage of perfection there begins the return of nature to the Universal Spirit. Indeed, the Subjective Spirit is the first appearance of the Universal Spirit as rationality and freedom. But in the narrow limits of individuality, the Subjective Spirit can never reach the fullness of rationality and freedom, which is the consummation of the entire process of the Spirit.

To realize this ultimate end (the fullness of rationality and freedom), the Subjective Spirit objectivates itself in many super individual forms; i.e., it constructs the ethical world. The first objectivation is the juridical order or right, which guarantees freedom to all in a measure compatible with the freedom of others. Right can regulate only external conduct. The spirit which aspires to regulate the interior world also, objectivates itself in a higher form, i.e., in morality. Morality concretizes itself: 1. In the family, in which the spirit reveals itself as a union of souls; 2.

In civil society, which is a larger and higher community of souls; and, lastly, 3. In the state, the highest revelation that the spirit gives to itself. The Objective Spirit of the people manifests itself in the State, which is the living God. The living God incarnates Himself now in this, now in that nation, according as the nation realizes more perfectly than any other the ideal of civilization. As the Spirit passes from one nation to another, the chosen people by the Spirit conquers and dominates the others. Although the state is the highest objectivation and manifestation of the Spirit,

Hegel places the Universal or Absolute Spirit over the objective spirit. The Absolute Spirit – which expresses itself through art, religion and philosophy -- fully actualizes the consciousness of its divine nature in a reckoning with itself. In art the Spirit apprehends its absolute essence as an idea expressing a sensible object: the beautiful is an idea sensibly concretized, in which the infinite is seen as finite. In religion, on the other hand, there is the unity of the finite with the infinite. The infinite is immanent in the finite, but in a sentimental, imaginative, mythical form. The Hegelian concept, in which the state is the living God and individuals but passing shadows, and in which, moreover, conflict and war are affirmations of the vitality of the state, has been put to the test in the German nation. Needless to say, Hegel's concept of reality is immanentist, pantheistic and atheistic.

1. Explain Marx's dialectic method.

Ans: While Hegel talks of resolving contradictions removed from Kant's pursuit of objective truth, his understanding of dialectic thought remained rooted in the notion of an ideal distinct from reality. Marx in a significant departure from the idealistic dialectics of Hegel embedded the Hegelian triad of affirmation, negation and the negation of negation in a more discrete zone of the socially apparent and the materially manifest.

The idea or the concept for Marx was not something that existed beyond social realities, as was Hegel's wont, but was the direct result of the forces shaping the concepts that underlay social reality. A more direct application of this idea translated into the field of historical materialism, whereby history became a result achieved through the resolution of the contradiction inherent in the hierarchy of social and specifically class, i.e. economic divisions. So for Marx history was a byproduct of the class struggle.

The attempt of the proletariat, or the economically marginalized, to correct the prevailing contradiction of their own subordinated existence. This was a direct application of the discourse of dialectics into the tangible or the real. A thought process that did not make such a move into the realm of pragmatic action would, for Marx, remain an empty ideology. Something that would be philosophising shallowly, akin to mysticism or spirituality, rather than a concrete imperative to action.

For Marx the demystification of Hegelian Dialectics was predicated upon the principle that the world was "knowable," the human mind in effect stood at the apex of a rational order which interpreted the dynamism of forces associated with social change and rendered that change with the possibility of interpretation: "To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (Capital, Volume 1, p.29). This line of thought is central to Marx's idea of control that can be exercised over a knowable and material world. In

such a world oppositions of power and authority, divided amongst strata of society that have access to authority and are denied it, are instrumental in initiating moves that would eventually resolve social contradictions premised on class.

To iterate an earlier argument, it is such moves working towards a resolution of ideas of control that create history. Anything that exists outside the purview of such a material movement would not classify as history in Marx's account. The concept of the Being is an integral part of Hegel's speculation regarding the process of knowing. The being, which in other words is the thesis, in trying to know and position itself also privileges the non-being or absence or anti-thesis, eventually the union of such an opposition results in a more absolutist version of 'becoming' where the spirit of the discourse becomes the synthesis.

But for Marx this version of dialectic thought privileging speculation remained at the level of dangerous metaphysics, dangerous because it made the individual in society impotent and incapable of action. Marx replaced the notion of unity within Hegelian dialectics with the idea of struggle. And to present it in a more reductive and perhaps vulgar fashion the struggle of a class of people over another with the ultimate aim of overthrowing one and gaining control over the means of production. It is at the height of an almost pre ordained logic that Marx declares his methodology of Dialectics to be: "scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of things. At the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary." (Capital) Contradiction lies at the heart of the critique that Marx offers, so also does Hegel, but for Hegel it is the route towards understanding a transcendent notion of being and space of the real occupied by the being. For Marx the contradiction is in a way pejorative and something that needs to be reconciled keeping in mind the demands of a more equitable social order. And it is to satisfy this demand that 'the critical' and the platform it provides for conflict and struggle becomes significant.
